



seL4 Present and Future

@GernotHeiser & Team
NICTA and UNSW Australia



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
UTAS

University of
Western Sydney
Bringing knowledge to life

What is seL4?



seL4: The latest (and most advanced) member of the L4 microkernel family – 20 years of history and experience




What is seL4?



**seL4: The world's most (only?)
secure OS kernel – provably!**

**GPLed
2014-07-29**


seL4: Mathematical *Proof* of Security



What seL4 is NOT: An Operating System




**All device drivers, OS services
are usermode processes**



What's Different to Other L4 Microkernels?



Design for isolation: No memory allocation in the kernel



High-Assurance System on seL4



DARPA HACMS Program:

- Provable vehicle safety
- “Red Team” must not be able to divert vehicle

Boeing Unmanned
Little Bird (AH-6)
Deployment Vehicle



SMACCMcopter
Research Vehicle




**Rockwell
Collins**




| galois |



SMACCM Research Vehicle Architecture



Architecting System-Level Security/Safety



Current NICTA Work on seL4




- High-performance multicore support
 - Release ETA: few months (ARM, x86)
- Full support for virtualisation extensions
 - Release ETA: few months (ARM, x86)
- 64-bit support
 - Release ETA: few month (x86), ??? (ARM64)
- Mechanisms for eliminating timing channels
 - ETA: 2015 (ARM and x86)
- Temporal isolation and mixed-criticality scheduling
 - ETA: 2015 (ARM and x86)
- Hardware failure resilience (DMR/TMR on multicore)
 - ETA: 2015 (ARM and x86)

What Else Is Cooking?



- Aim: Cost reduction by automation and abstraction
 - Present seL4 cost: \$400/SLOC, high-assurance, high-performance
 - Other “high” assurance: \$1,000/SLOC, no proof, poor performance
 - Low assurance (Pistachio): \$200/SLOC, no proof, high performance
- Device driver synthesis
 - Synthesise driver code from hardware and OS interface specs
 - works already for simple devices
- Code and proof co-generation
 - High-level spec in DSL describes logic, generate C code and proofs
 - File systems as case study
- Type- and memory-safe high-level languages
 - Do verification cheaper in HLL semantics
 - Requires verified HLL run-time and compilers

seL4 Ecosystem: Kernel Development



How Can YOU Contribute?



- Libraries presently extremely rudimentary
 - POSIX! ...
- Platform ports
 - Especially popular ARM boards: Tegra, RK3188, Beaglebone, ...
- Drivers!!!!!!
 - Very few available ATM
- Network stacks and file systems
 - Presently have lwIP, incomplete functionality
- Tools
 - Have component system (CAmkES), glue generators
- Languages
 - Core C++ support just released, lacks std template lib
 - Haskell presently in progress (with Galois) – stay tuned
 - Python would be **awesome!**

Why NOT Use seL4?



- Very rudimentary programming environment!
 - Fair enough
 - **You** can help to fix this!
- I like unsafe/insecure systems!
 - Ok, go shoot yourself
- I like the thrill of danger!
 - Like getting sued for building a critical system on outdated technology
- Actually, I want to use seL4!
 - Right answer ;-)

<http://seL4.systems>

gernot@nicta.com.au

<http://microkerneldude.wordpress.com>

[@GernotHeiser](#)